

Мастер-классы по исследованиям в бухгалтерском учете (Seminars on research in accounting)

Мастер-класс 1.

Часть 1. Зачем раскрывать информацию?

Теоретические модели раскрытия и верификации информации, реакция рынка на информацию, стимулы удерживать информацию. *Akerlof 1970, Spence 1973, Verrecchia 1983, Jung and Kwon 1988.*

Эмпирические исследования. *Heinle, Samuels, Taylor 2020, Kim, Taylor, Verrecchia 2021, Heinle, Kim, Taylor, Zhou 2020.*

Часть 2-1. А что, если информация неточная?

Структурные модели управления отчетностью. «Бумажное» и реальное управление отчетностью, мошенничество и его обнаружение. *Dechow et al, 2010, Beyer et al, 2018, Luneva, 2021, Zakolyukina, 2018, Terry, Whited, Zakolyukina, 2021.*

Мастер-класс 2.

Часть 2-2. А что, если информация неточная? (part 2)

Часть 3. А как использовать информацию для компенсации менеджеров?

Теоретические модели характеристик контрактов, атрибуты информации, используемой в контрактах, контракты в случае многомерных действий агента. *Jensen, Meckling, 1976, Holmstrom, 1979, Banker, Datar, 1989, Feltham, Xie, 1994.*

Эмпирические исследования. Как устроены контракты с CEO? Почему они так много получают? *Core, Guay 1999, Conyon, Core, Guay, 2011.*

Мастер-класс 3.

Часть 4. Только финансовые показатели...?

Корпоративная социальная ответственность и раскрытие информации о ней. ESG-предпочтения инвесторов.

Теоретические модели. *Pastor, Stambaugh, Taylor 2021, Friedman, Heinle, Luneva, 2021.*

Эмпирические исследования. *Martin, Moser, 2016, Sautner, Lev, Vilkov, Zhang 2020, Lu, 2020, Dai, Liang, Ng, 2020.*

Часть 5. Что мы не обсудили...

Чем еще занимается accounting и почему это важно.

Список литературы

- Akerlof, G. (1970). The Market for 'Lemons'. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
- Banker, R. D., & Datar, S. M. (1989). Sensitivity, Precision, and Linear Aggregation of Signals for Performance Evaluation. *Journal of Accounting Research*.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2491205>
- Beyer, A., Guttman, I., & Marinovic, I. (2019). Earnings management and earnings quality: Theory and Evidence. *Accounting Review*, 94(4), 77–101. <https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-52282>
- Canyon, M. J., Core, J. E., & Guay, W. R. (2011). Are U.S. CEOs paid more than U.K. CEOs? Inferences from risk-adjusted pay. *Review of Financial Studies*.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhq112>
- Core, J., & Guay, W. (1999). The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101\(99\)00019-1](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(99)00019-1)
- Dai, R., Liang, H., & Ng, L. (2020). Socially responsible corporate customers. *Journal of Financial Economics*, (xxxx). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.01.003>
- Dechow, P., Ge, W., & Schrand, C. (2010). Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.001>
- Feltham, G. A., & Xie, J. (1994). Performance Measure Congruity and Diversity in Multi-Task Principal/Agent Relations. *The Accounting Review*.
- Friedman, Henry L. and Heinle, Mirko Stanislav and Luneva, Irina, A theoretical framework for environmental and social impact reporting (September 28, 2021). Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3932689> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3932689>
- Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. *Journal of Financial Economics*.
[https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X\(76\)90026-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X)
- Jung, W.-O., & Kwon, Y. K. (1988). Disclosure When the Market Is Unsure of Information Endowment of Managers. *Journal of Accounting Research*.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/2491118>
- Heinle, M. S., Kim, C., Taylor, D., & Zhou, F. (2020). Long-Term Information in the Decision to Provide a Short-Term Forecast. *SSRN Electronic Journal*.
<https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3700554>
- Heinle, Mirko Stanislav and Samuels, Delphine and Taylor, Daniel, Proprietary Costs and Disclosure Substitution: Theory and Empirical Evidence (October 26, 2020). Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3173664> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3173664>

- Holmstrom, B. (1979). Moral Hazard and Observability. *The Bell Journal of Economics*.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320>
- Kim, J. M., Taylor, D. J., & Verrecchia, R. E. (2021). Correction to: Voluntary disclosure when private information and disclosure costs are jointly determined (Review of Accounting Studies, (2021), 26, 3, (971-1001), 10.1007/s11142-021-09601-z). *Review of Accounting Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-021-09623-7>
- Lu, S. (2021). The Green Bonding Hypothesis: How do Green Bonds Enhance the Credibility of Environmental Commitments? *SSRN Electronic Journal*.
<https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3898909>
- Luneva, Irina, How Much Does the Market Know? (September 18, 2021). Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926288> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3926288>
- Martin, P. R., & Moser, D. V. (2016). Managers' green investment disclosures and investors' reaction. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.08.004>
- Pástor, L., Stambaugh, R. F., & Taylor, L. A. (2021). Sustainable investing in equilibrium. *Journal of Financial Economics*, (xxxx). <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.12.011>
- Sautner, Z., van Lent, L., Vilkov, G., & Zhang, R. (2020). Firm-level Climate Change Exposure. *SSRN Electronic Journal*, (October). <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3642508>
- Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/1882010>
- Terry, S., Whited, T. M., & Zakolyukina, A. A. (2018). Information versus Investment. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3073956>
- Verrecchia, R. E. (1983). Discretionary disclosure. *Journal of Accounting and Economics*.
[https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101\(83\)90011-3](https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(83)90011-3)
- Zakolyukina, A. A. (2018). How Common Are Intentional GAAP Violations? Estimates from a Dynamic Model. *Journal of Accounting Research*, 56(1), 5–44.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12190>