Встреча общефакультетского научного семинара состоится во вторник, 16 октября
Koen Schoors (Ghent University) Corruption in public procurement: reserve prices and publication period
We develop a new methodology to identify corruption in public procurement auctions with reserve prices and apply it to Russian public procurement auctions of gasoline in 2011–2013. We identify corrupt procurer-seller pairs by exploiting the variation in reserve prices. Since auction reserve prices are set by the procurer before the auction, they should be independent from the identity of the winning seller. We estimate reserve prices as a function of the local market price, contract, procurer and time controls, and procurer-seller fixed effects. A procurer-seller pair is labeled as potentially corrupt if its pair fixed effect is significantly larger than the average procurer fixed effect. Despite their reserve price overpricing, corrupt sellers face less competition in auctions organized by procurers with whom they form a corrupt pair and have a higher probability of wining these auctions. Auctions won by corrupt pairs also exhibit higher final contract prices. The negative effect of reserve price manipulation on final prices is mitigated by higher competition and can even be fully offset by electronic auctions with sufficient competition. In seal bid auctions competition is further reduced by avoiding the rules about the minimum required publication period.
Время: 15:40
Аудитория: 421
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16 окт. 2018
